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I. ABSTRACT
Since the 1980s, conflicts and violence involving pastoral communities in
the borderlands of northern Kenya have become endemic. The violence has
especially taken the form of banditry and cattle rustling. The emergence of
cattle warlords among the pastoral groups has contributed to the
internationalization and commercialization of cattle rustling activities. Acts of
banditry and cattle rustling have led to loss of human lives, stealing of livestock,
*
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and displacement of populations. Thus violence and insecurity have become the
order of the day in the region. This Chapter analyzes the violence and
insecurity in the borderlands of northern Kenya using the social cubism
perspective to demonstrate how issues in a conflict are often related and
interlinked with one another. The Chapter also examines possible strategies for
a third party conflict intervention to control or deescalate the violence.
II. INTRODUCTION

Since the 1990s communal conflicts have become endemic all over the
World. There are both internal and external events and trends that have
contributed to the emergence of these conflicts.' In Africa for example, conflict
and violence seem to assume different dimensions, ranging from civil wars in
Somalia, Liberia, Congo Democratic Republic and Sierra Leone to genocide in
Rwanda and Burundi. Such conflicts have severely undermined the social
cohesion of African states.
The last twenty years have witnessed an escalation of violence and
insecurity in the form of banditry and cattle rustling (raids) in the borderlands
of northern Kenya.2 Generally speaking, cattle rustling between pastoral groups
cuts across communal lines and national borders. The phrase, "borderlands of
northern Kenya" is used in this article to refer to the region straddling the
Kenyan, Ugandan, Sudanese, Ethiopian, and Somalian borders. The area is
often referred to as "bandit zone" or "bandit belt" because of the illegal firearms
in the hands of pastoral groups who are using them to create havoc in the form
of cattle rustling and banditry.3 The term "pastoralists" is applied in the study
to denote people whose main mode of production is the herding of livestock
such as cattle, camels, goats, and donkeys on extensive bases or in combination
with some form of agricultural activities.4 In Eastern Africa, such communities
include the Turkana, the Pokot, the Samburu, the Somali, and the Borana of
Kenya, the Toposa and the Merille of Ethiopia and Sudan, and the Karamojong
and the Jie of Uganda.
1.

TED ROBERT GURR & BARBARA HARFF, ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN WORLD POLITICS, (1994);

RODERICK VON LIPSEY, BREAKING THE CYCLE: A FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT INTERVENTION (1997);
WILLIAM I. ZARTMAN, COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION OF LEGIMATE AUTHORITY (1995).

2.
John Mbaria, Suguta valley ofDeath, THE EAST AFRICAN, Oct. 9,2000, at 12; Makumi Mwagiru,
Borders, Frontiers and Conflict in the Horn of Africa: Some Preliminary Hypotheses (2000) (unpublished
seminar paper, University of Nairobi).
3.
Alex Mwangangi, Kenya's PastoralAreas- An Arch ofConflict?,THE EASTAFRICAN, September
15-21, 1999, available at http://www.nationaudio.com/News/EastAfrican /130999/.. ./opinion2.html;
available at
Ferocious Tribal Warfare, WEEKLY REVIEW, March 12, 1999:
http://wwww.africaonline.co.ke/weeklyreview/990312/kenya3.html.
4.

M. Mahmud Khan, Market Based Early Warning Indicators of Famine for the Pastoral

Households of the Sahel, 22 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 2, 198 (1994).
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Thus, a study of the political economy of violence and insecurity amidst
challenges of globalization and the new World order is central to our
understanding of ethnopolitical and communal conflict in Eastern Africa. We
intend in this chapter, to address the following pertinent issues as they relate to
violence and insecurity in the borderlands: What are the main causes of
violence and insecurity in northern Kenya? Is the conflict resource or identity
based? How can the conflict and violence be addressed? What level of conflict
resolution intervention is necessary in the region?
This chapter examines and analyzes the political economy of violence and
insecurity in the borderlands of northern Kenya with particular emphasis on the
banditry and cattle rustling phenomena. Part One of the chapter provides a
contextual background of the pastoral economy as it relates to conflict over
resources, especially in the last thirty years or thereabout. Part Two provides
an analysis of the conflict using the social cubism model. Part Three discusses
what type of third party intervention may be useful in facilitating a resolution
of the conflict. In the conclusion, the chapter provides a compressed discussion
of the key ideas in the study.
Ill. BANDITRY AND CATTLE RUSTLING IN THE PASTORAL ECONOMY: A
CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

Much of northern Kenya is semi-arid, and the area is only suitable for a
pastoral mode of production. Available evidence shows that pastoralists have
been able to eke out a frugal existence from the harsh climatic environment of
the borderlands for centuries.' Throughout their history livestock has been their
economic and social lifeline. Some of the pastoralists such as the Turkana and
the Pokot, however, practice transhumance, a settled form of pastoralism
through which only animals are moved in search of pasture and water while the
families settle "permanently" in given locations.
Historically, firearms seem to have not played a prominent role in the early
military organization of East African pastoral and semi-pastoral communities.
It was only in the late 19th century that the pioneer East African Coastal ArabSwahili traders and the 'Khatoumers' ventured into the borderlands of Eastern
Africa and the Nile headwaters thereby introducing firearms as a trade item.6
Undoubtedly, at present pastoralists in the borderlands are facing unprecedented
See Mohammed Ali Salih, Agro-Pastoralism:An UnderestimatedRegional Food Production
5.
System, in EASTERN AFRICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH REV. Vol. 1X, No. 1, at 23 (1993); R. M. A VAN
ZWANENBERG & ANNE KING, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF KENYA AND UGANDA, 1800-1970 (1975);
KATSUYHOSHI FUKUI & DAVID TURTON, WARFARE AMONG EAST AFRICAN HERDERS (1979).
See BETHUEL A. OGOT, ECONOMIC ADAPTATION AND CHANGE AMONG THE Jil-SPEAKING
6.
PEOPLES OF EAST AFRICA (1996); ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA (Katsuyoshi Fukui &
John Markakis, Eds. 1994); THE WARRIOR TRADITION IN MODERN AFRICA (Ali Mazrui, ed. 1997)
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challenges in their long history that often lead to serious violent struggle for
survival. In the last twenty-five years, for example, ecological cataclysms,
droughts, famines as well as competition for resources have contributed to
conflict and violence among pastoral communities. 7 A majority of pastoral
societies in the borderlands have therefore become militarized and increasingly
rely on firearms.
However, Odegi-Awuondo contends that the root causes of the current
socio-economic problems in pastoral areas can be traced to the policies of the
British colonial Government.8 For instance, in its attempt to pacify these
communities, the colonial Government adopted harsh policies, which
contributed to the economic and political marginalization of these communities.
For example, the Government favored the establishment of White settler
plantation agriculture in Kenya at the expense of peasant economy. In order to
make more fertile land available for alienation for White settlement, the colonial
Government demarcated small 'tribal' reserves for African populations. 9 Most
pastoral communities were consequently pushed out of the most fertile land into
the drier parts of the country. Moreover, colonial officials regarded pastoralism
as a primitive mode of production and efforts were therefore made to discourage
it. For instance, the first colonial Governor of Kenya, Sir Charles Eliot declared
that pastoralism had no future in Kenya."° Also colonial anthropologists
propagated myths about the low status of pastoralism in the human social and
economic evolution.
Since colonial times pastoral communities have faced State harassment and
repression. For example, during the colonial period, northern Kenya was a
closed district and was administered by military officers." Free movement of
people and animals in and out of the district was restricted. This policy was
aimed at monitoring activities of the pastoral groups. The British referred to
pastoral groups such as the Turkana and the Pokot as 'war-like', violent, and as
recalcitrant communities. This stereotyping was a way of creating an enemy
image and justification for counter aggression. 2 For example, the Government
often sent punitive military expeditions against the pastoralists. Such
expeditions often led to the killing of people, and confiscation of livestock.

7.

ETHNiCITY AND CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, supra note 6, at 147.

8.

CASPER ODEGi-AWUONDO, LIFE IN THE BALANCE:

ECOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY OF TURKANA

NOMADS 44 (1990).
9.

R.M.A.VAN ZWANENBERG, COLONIAL CAPITALISM AND LABOUR IN KENYA 1919-1939 (1975);

M.P.K, SORRENSON, ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN KENYA (1968).
10.

David M. Anderson, Cow Power: Livestock and the Pastoralistsin Africa, AFRICAN AFFAIRS

92(366) (1993), at 121.
11.

WiLLIAM R. OCHIENG, AN OUTLINE HISTORY OF THE RIFT VALLEY (1980).

12.

ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, supra note 6, at 193.
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The post-independence Kenyan Government seems to have adopted the
same strategy in dealing with frequent cattle rustling activities in the
borderlands.' 3 However, despite the use of force, the State has not achieved its
objectives. Rather it has exacerbated the problem. The bandits and cattle
raiders, for example, often possess more sophisticated weapons than those of the
Government's security forces. The bandits, therefore, appear to reign supreme
in the borderlands. Consequently, as a means of obtaining a few animals and
improving one's fighting ability, raiding had evolved into almost full-scale
military operation. 4 Not only young men were killed, but women and children
were murdered as well. Huts, stores, and harvests were set on fire and shops
looted.
The political turmoil in the neighboring countries in the 1980s provided an
opportunity for pastoralists to easily acquire lethal firearms.'" Moreover, some
African governments, rather than resolving long-standing ethnic conflicts, have
tended to provide weapons to one group to fight against another. For example,
the on-going civil war in Southern Sudan has proved to be a boom for the
firearm trade in the borderlands. 6 For instance, both the Sudanese government
and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) guerillas, provide arms to
their collaborators in the region.
Since the late 1970s, the following combination of factors has contributed
to the apparent destitution of pastoralists in northern Kenya."' First, cattle
diseases wiped out most of the livestock. Second, perennial droughts led to
famine. Third, there was an increase in cattle raids and military attacks by
heavily armed Karamajong and Turkana raiders, collectively termed Ngorokos
(bandits). In addition, between 1984 and 1986, the Kenyan Government sent
a punitive military operation into the pastoral district of Pokot ostensibly to
seize illegal firearms. That major security operation is referred to by the Pokot
as the "Lotiriri," after the noise of the helicopters used in the Government

13.

ODEGI-AWUONDO, supra note 8.

14.

Mwangangi, supra note 3.

15.

ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, supra note 6; Ferocious Tribal Warfare,

supra note 3.

16.
Stop These Merchants of Terror, WEEKLY REVIEW, Feb. 25, 1999, available at
http://www.africaonline.co.ke/weeldr review/990312/editorial.html; and Marc-Antoine P. de Motclos, The
Proliferationof Light Weapons in PastoralNorthern Kenya, in MONOGRAPH, NO.30, CONTROLLING SMALL
ARMS PROLIFERATION AND REVERSING CULTURES OF VIOLENCE N AFRICA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN 8 (1998)
(Cape Town Institute of Strategic Studies, available at http://.iss.co.za/Pubs/ MONOGRAPHS/30
/Section%20 one.html).
17.
IN SEARCH OF COOL GROUND: WAR, FLIGHT AND HOMECOMING IN NORTH EAST AFRICA (Tim
Allen, ed. 1996); Eboe Hutchful, Demilitarising the Political Process in Africa: Some Basic Issues, 6
AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 2, 1 (1997); ODEGI-AWUONDO, supra note 8.
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onslaught against them and their animals.' 8 During the operations, the security
forces confiscated thousands of Pokot livestock while others died because of the
drought or lack of adequate attention while in the hands of security forces. Such
measures obviously did not achieve the intended results since they seemed not
to address the root causes of cattle rustling.
Furthermore, from the late 1970s cattle rustling operations took a new
dimension based solely on individualistic rather than societal interests. For
example, while traditional raids hinged on communal interests and were
monitored by the community through laid down social norms, these new raids
are based entirely on private interests and are controlled by armed village
leaders.' 9 This tendency has led to the emergence of cattle Warlords. Cattle
warlordism is a phenomenon that emerged among the Pokot and the Turkana in
the 1980s. The phenomenon came into the limelight when a number of
charismatic, influential, and wealthy people arose in these communities
promising the people prosperity and security. These Cattle Warlords include
ex-chief, ex-servicemen, businessmen, and ritual experts. They have created
armed private militia, which, apart from providing local security, also go on
cattle raids against neighboring communities and across the border into Uganda,
Ethiopia, and Sudan. Warlordism has thus apparently turned into a profitable
venture for both Warlords and their retainers.20 For example, they have
maintained a strong trade network with neighboring countries. The Warlords
often organize joint cattle raiding operations, involving thousands of retainers
into Uganda, Sudan, and Ethiopia. Cattle Warlords thus appear to be the new
entrepreneurs of violence. According to Reno, a warlord is typically a civilian
who arms civilians with rudimentary weapons to serve his political, economic,
and social interests.21 Ironically, some-State officials, especially security forces
and former servicemen, are also reportedly engaged in cattle rustling activities,
an occupation that has become a lucrative venture for them.
Traditionally, cattle rustling among the pastoralists was a cultural practice
and was regarded as merely a kind of "dangerous sport."22
Under the
traditional government system, the elders had the power to control or sanction
raids. Cattle raids were thus regarded as an acceptable communal response to
natural calamities and as a means for replenishing lost stock. The youth play a

18.

Ferocious Tribal Warfare,supra note 3.

19.
Charles M. Ocan, Pastoralcrisisin north-easternUganda: The changingsignificanceof raids,
WORKING PAPER No. 2. (1992) (Centre for Basic Research Publishers).
20.

Ferocious Tribal Warfare, supra note 3.

21.

See generally WILLIAM S. RENO, WARLORD POLITICS AND AFRICAN STATES (1998).

22.

John Mbaria, Suguta Valley of Death, THE EAST AFRICAN, October 9. 2000, available at
http://www.nationaudio.com/News/EastAfrican/current/Featurres/Features 1.html. See alsoMachariaGaitho,
Arming the Pokot was Folly; Now Disarm Them, DAILY NATION, March 26, 2001, at 6.
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prominent role in the system of warlordism. They offer their services by joining
the warlord ragtag militia groups. Violence and insecurity in the borderlands
have become serious regional issues and not merely a local problem. Much of
the borderlands is deserted. Most families are often forced to flee their homes
for refugee camps and small trading centers in Kenya and Uganda.23
Banditry and cattle rustling activities in northern Kenya have affected
millions of people, ranging from the Turkana in the north, the Samburu and the
Pokot in the center, and the Keiyo, the Marakwet, and the Tugen in the south of
the study area. Cattle rustling activities however, are more intense among the
Pokot and the Turkana communities. For example, each pastoral group tries to
tilt the military scale to its favor. It keeps on shifting especially between the
Pokot and the Turkana.24 This apparent rivalry leads to an endless cycle of
retributive raids and counter-raids between the two communities. The pastoral
communities are thus involved in an arms race of their own coinage. Bandits
and Cattle Warlords seem to thrive in this environment of lawlessness. The
ability of the Warlords to organize and arm their forces is a clear indication that
the State has lost the monopoly over the use of force.25 It is worth noting that
pastoral groups often live in scattered villages which makes it difficult for the
State to effectively control them. Because of the state of anarchy and
lawlessness in the borderlands of northern Kenya, it is very difficult to
implement any development project. The few Government officers and NGOs
based in the area live in constant fear of bandits.
IV. A SOCIAL CUBISM PERSPECTIVE
The chapter now analyzes the dynamics of violence and insecurity in the
borderlands of northern Kenya using the social cubism framework. 26 The social
cubism model takes cognisance of potential internal factors to elucidate the
complexities of conflict. The framework shows how in ethnopolitical conflicts,
the conflict plays out in diverse dimensions of social life such as the political,
economic, and social realms. It is possible to use the model to demonstrate the
nexus of relationships between economic, political, psychocultural,
demographic, religious, and historical factors. These dynamics of conflict in the
various social locales relate mutually with each other to entrench the conflict
and make it resistant to resolution.
23.

Ocan, supra note 19.

24.

FerociousTribal Warfare, supra note 3; Mwangangi, supranote 3.

25.

Id.

26.
Sean J.Byrne & Neal Carter, Social Cubism: Six Social Forcesof EthnoterritorialConflict in
Northern Ireland and Quebec, in PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, 3(2), at 52. See also Neal Carter & Sean
J. Byrne, The Dynamics of Social Cubism: A View from Northern Ireland and Quebec, in RECONCILABLE
DIFFERENCES: TURNING POINTS TO ETHNOPOLmCAL CONFLICT (Sean Byrne & Cynthia L Irvin, eds., 2000).
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The social cubism framework is useful in conflict analysis because it shows
the need for conflict resolution interveners to analyse conflict from all angles
and perspectives. In other words, just like a cube that has six sides, issues in
any given conflict are often related and interlinked to one another.
Consequently, in order to comprehend a conflict we have to identify and address
all factors that impinge on it in one form or another.
V. HISTORICAL FACTORS

Historically, pastoral communities have inhabited the borderlands of
northern Kenya from time immemorial.27 It is important to note that like other
African countries except Ethiopia, Kenyajust like many other African countries,
is a colonial creation or a 'geographical expression'. Before colonialism, each
pastoral group was a separate nation living under its own social and political
institutions. Colonial boundaries, however, incorporated diverse groups of
people who had no cultural or political links or who were traditional enemies
into the same political entity in the name of Kenya.
Many pastoral communities for example, do not see themselves as Kenyans
because of their long distance from the center of political administration.2" For
instance, they refer to any person travelling southward beyond their districts as
'going to Kenya'. Interestingly enough, the economic way of life of pastoral
communities is quite different from that of the majority of other Kenyan groups.
Apparently, the pastoralists seem to feel that they have very little access to state
economic resources. Pastoral communities in northern Kenya generally view
the Government as representing a sort of internal colonialism. For example, in
the 1960s, the Somali of northern Kenya waged protracted though unsuccessful
guerrilla warfare against Kenya in an attempt to secede and join the republic of
Somalia. Apart from missionaries and NGOs, State involvement in economic
development and provision of social services to the pastoral groups in northern
Kenya is minimal.29 Consequently, influential pastoral leaders often instill a
'siege mentality' within their people to make them feel they have been pushed
to the wall and they must react in one form or another to re-assert themselves,
safeguard their interests, and make the Government accede to their various
demands. For instance, Jay Rothman clearly points, conflicts in Africa are often

27.

VAN ZWANENBERG & KING, supra note 5, at ch. I.

28.

Mwagiru, supra note 2

29.
David Western, Drought: Kenyans Have Not Seen Anything Yet, THE NATION, June 29, 2000
available at http://www.climateark.org/articles/2000/2nd/drkehano.html.
See also MUKISHA KITUYi,
BECOMING KENYANS: MAASAI PASTORALISM (1992) (African Centre for Technology); ODEGI-AWUONDO,
supra note 8.
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"deeply rooted in existential issues like cultural expressions and survival
itself."3 °
VI. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

Psychological factors include identity, self-esteem, fear, and anger, among
others. The pastoralists traditionally regard themselves as a fearless and a
hardened people. 3' This feeling is probably due to their harsh environment. For
example, they have high regard for their cultural practice of cattle raiding.
Moreover, they feel that unless they keep their enemies at bay they may be
overwhelmed and defeated militarily. Hence, the tendency to organise raids
against their neighbors. They also have a strong attachment to their culture,
which they feel has passed the test of time.3" Pastoral groups have remained
homogenous in values and interests. Such a uniformity often leads to what Von
Lipsey describes as concern for preserving only those things that are perceived
to be of value to the group or capable of increasing the group's power relative
to others within the society. That preservation of narrowly defined interests
work to the detriment of broader affiliations required for stability within the
society and the state.33
Over the years there has been systematic erosion of the pastoralists' value,
ideology and lifestyles. However, livestock still remains the cornerstone of their
economy.34 For example, cattle have a lot of social and ritual values to most
pastoral groups. Cattle are used in many forms of reciprocal relationships such
as building social alliances, exchanges in times of marriages, to pay fines,
sacrifices, loans to friends and relatives. Pastoralists see their cultural values as
superior and unadulterated by 'outside' influence. Thus, among pastoral
communities, killing of out-groups members (especially warriors) and stealing
their livestock are culturally and socially acceptable practices and a sign of
bravery.35 For example, among the Turkana and Jie (of Uganda), cattle raiding
was such an important activity that everybody was expected to partake in. As
John Lampear observes: "Any one even the uninitiated, could go and fight...
What would uninitiated men eat if they just remained at home? Does the
30.

See generally JAY ROTMAN,

RESOLVING-IDENTITY-BASED

CONFLICT

IN NATIONS,

ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMUNITIES (1997).
31.

KANA ROBA DUBA ET AL., HONEY AND HEIFER, GRASSES, MILK, AND WATER: A HERITAGE OF

DIVERSITY INRECONCILIATION (1997). See also Mbaria, supra note 22.
32.

Id.

33.

VON UPSEY, supra note 1.

34.

DUBA ET AL., supra note 31.

35.
Francis Deng, Reaching Out: A Dinka Principleof Conflict Management, in TRADITIONAL
CURES FOR MODERN AFRICAN CONFLICTS: AFRICAN CONFLICTMEDICINE 95 (1.William Zartman, ed.) (2000);
DUBA ET AL., supra note 3 1.
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stomach distinguish between men?"36 Such 'bravado' attitude encouraged
militancy among the youth who wanted to prove their manliness and military
prowess by going on raids. Traditionally, cattle raiding by pastoral
communities was both a natural response to disasters such as drought, and an
attempt to increase the numbers of their livestock as an insurance against
disasters. Also, it was a cultural practice of proving the worth of one's
community.3 7
Kenyan Governments, since the colonial era, have attempted to control
pastoral activities. During the colonial period, for example, the aim was
ostensibly to pacify the pastoralists and to enforce law and order.38 Thus, for a
long time the official State policy tended to view cattle rustling as a mere
cultural problem of the pastoralists and not a serious issue of State security.
Yet, cattle rustling has now turned out to be a threat to State security.
VII. ECONOMIC FACTORS

Economic factors are also important in our understanding of the violence
and insecurity situation in the borderlands. For example, Ali Said 39 points out
that pastoral groups had self reliant economies which met most of their basic
needs Also, networks of exchange between pastoralists and cultivators have
always existed. Such reciprocal relations could enable the pastoralists to gain
access to cereals, salt, and pasture, among other items when required. However,
at present, because of the strong resource competition and conflict in the region,
the herder-farmer dichotomy has become quite manifest.'
Basically, the age-old economic existence of pastoral economy has been
undermined by three major factors, namely: the emergence of nation-states, the
penetration of the market economy, climatic changes, and ecological
cataclysms. The incorporation of the pastoral economy into the global market
economy to some extent has also impacted negatively on societal structure, as
well as on the ethical, and moral foundations. 4 The Government's apparent
bias towards agriculture is a clear indication of the low regard of pastoralism in
36.

ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT INTHE HORN OF AFRICA, supra note 6, at 63.

37.

Deng, supra note 35.

38.

OCHIENG, supra note 11.

39.
Ali Said, Resource Use conflict Between Pastoralism and IrrigationDevelopment in the Middle
Awash Valley of Ethiopia, Vol. 1, No. 2, EASTERN AFRICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH REVIEW 21, 29
(1994).
40.
Gudrun Dahl and A. Hjort, Pastoral Change and the Role of Drought, SAREC Report R. 2
(1979) (Stockholm: Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries). See also
Mohammed Babiker, East African Dryland Pastoralism: Some Methodological Anxieties (1999) (unpublished
seminar paper, University of Khartoum).
41.

Said, supra note 39.
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State circles. For example, the international economy puts demand for more
cash crops hence alienation of pastoral land for the establishment of large
agricultural plantations. Much of the traditional pastoral grazing lands have
thus become private property of other people, under the State sanctioned
"willing-buyer-willing seller" principle. As John Mbaria correctly sums it:
"The old symbiosis between the pastoralists and the sedentary farmer has
broken down, suspicion and occasionally bloody conflict have taken its place,
fanned by politicians with a self-aggrandising agenda."42
Undoubtedly, pastoral production system requires extensive land space for
livestock movements in response to changing weather and climatic patterns.
Pastoral groups depend largely on the products of their livestock. Thus to
continue with their age-old pastoral practice they have to raid other communities
to replenish lost stock. Hence, they suffer "tit for tat" raids. Moreover, the
pastoral districts of northern Kenya are largely underdeveloped in terms of
infrastructures, resource allocations, and availability of economic and social
services.
VIII. RELIGIOUS FACTORS

Religion seems not to play a prominent role in the violence and insecurity
of pastoral groups in the borderlands. It is worth noting that most members of
the pastoral communities still practice traditional religion although a significant
number of people have converted to Christianity.43 Traditional ritual experts
(Emuron) had a lot of influence in pastoral societies. In case of conflict, these
religious leaders in tandem with the elders would seek an amicable solution
acceptable to all the parties involved. Ritual experts were regarded as divinely
inspired and no one could challenge their decisions. Moreover, in the traditional
pastoral set up, elders were the judicial and political decision-makers.
The elders, at various levels handled all major conflicts in the society.4
For example, whenever there was a serious conflict between neighboring groups
the elders from both sides would call a peace palaver to try and resolve the
dispute. Members of the public were also allowed to attend and participate in
the peace making ceremony. The meeting would be held in a carnival
atmosphere punctuated with stories, songs, dance, and proverbs. The name of
God and spirits would be invoked during the meeting. A bull would be
slaughtered and its blood sprinkled into the air as a way of binding the
disputants and members of the two communities to the covenant. As a gesture
of reconciliation the whole group would eat the meat together. The whole
42.

Mbaria, supra note 22.

43.

DUBA E"AL., supra note 31.

44.

Id.
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society would thus be part of the agreement and anybody who violated it could
suffer some calamity. By and large, negotiation, reconciliation or peace making
was seen as re-establishment of relationship between the people and also with
their God and spirits that were seen as witnesses and active participants.
Agreements were entered into solemnly by the taking of oaths and participating
in rituals that were regarded as binding and sacred. Punishment, restitution, and
reconciliation were based on the norms and values of the society. Thus,
emphasis was placed on the repair of damaged relations rather than retribution.4"
However, the pastoral societies are currently undergoing transformation
due to Western and Christian influence.' Thus the powers of the elders and
ritual experts have declined as warrior-youth and educated elite acquire more
prominence in the society. Traditionally, before any raiding expedition, the
elders or spiritual leaders had to bless the raiders. Nowadays, however, such
blessings are rare since cattle Warlords themselves tend to organize most raids
without consulting the traditional political leadership. Nevertheless, there are
still a few pockets of ritual experts who bless warriors before raids, for
economic gains. For example, in April 2001, President Moi of Kenya is
reported to have issued a warning to such ritual experts telling them to
discontinue the practice or face arrest by police.47 It is my contention that these
ritual experts are likely to ignore such threats. In reality the State no longer has
effective control over northern Kenya. In that respect there are good reasons to
believe that indigenous approaches to conflict resolution could be valuable in
helping to resolve some of the conflicts in the borderlands.
IX. POLITICAL FACTORS
Politics is a major contributory factor to the current insecurity and violence
in the borderlands. The Government's reaction to its frustration and inability
to control acts of lawlessness has mainly been to send in security forces, who
more often than not opt to harass the civilian population for allegedly
collaborating with bandits and cattle rustlers instead of facing the enemy.48
Such inhuman acts tend to make the State unpopular and the people unwilling
to cooperate with security forces. For example, whenever security forces fail
in their operations against bandits, they often vent their anger on civilian
45.
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population. They are terrorized both by the government and by the bandits.
Hence, the peoples' tendency to run away and escape from the reach of both.
The question that one may ask is what are the options left for the pastoralists?
The pastoral communities feel disfranchised by the Kenyan political
system. 9 For example, leaders of pastoral communities often express feelings
of exclusion from the center of national power and marginalization in all aspects
of life. For instance, the Kenyan Government seems to have adopted economic
and political policies, which tend to perpetuate the marginalization of pastoral
communities. This fact is evident in the distribution of economic and political
resources. The Government appears to recognize the importance of these
societies only when it requires their political support, such as during election
time.
As such, pastoral leaders have often used the poverty and
underdevelopment in their areas aS evidence of State marginalization. 5° Some
local political leaders tend to encourage their people to continue with the ageold cultural practice of cattle rustling. These politicians seem to fear that a
denunciation of the practice of cattle rustling may be politically suicidal. Such
leaders claim to be defenders of their people when in fact their aim is to
safeguard their own interests or to forestall the emergence of any potential
challenge to their authority. It is important to note that while these leaders ask
their people to remain steadfast in their cultural way of life, these same leaders
send their children to local colleges and abroad for higher education.5 This
tends to create a form of class differentiation in the society in which a few
educated pastoral families continue to possess political power at the expense of
the poor majority peasant-herders.
In addition, these local political elite inculcates in their people a 'siege
mentality' by claiming that unless they act decisively to defend themselves they
would be wiped out by their traditional enemies.5 2 For example, the Pokot
leaders have rejected a call by the President of Kenya, Daniel arap Moi that they
surrender all illegal arms to the government. They declared that surrendering
their weapons would make their people vulnerable to attacks by the militarized
Karamonjong of Uganda. The Pokot are thus turning to their history to support
raids and other acts of violence against neighboring communities. For example,
in March 2001, a man by the name of Samuel Moroto was elected the new
Pokot Member of Parliament for Kapenguria to replace one of the alleged Pokot
Warlords, and former Cabinet Minister, the late Francis Lotodo. A few days
49.

Id.

50.
DAILY NATION, Feb. 21, 2001, available at http./Iwww.nationaudio.com/News /DailyNation
/21022001/index.html; Mbaria, supra note 22.
51.

Babiker, supra note 40.

52.
Mbaria, supra note 22; see also SUNDAY NATION, Apr. 22, 2001, available at
http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/22042001/News/News58.html.

ILSA Journalof International& Comparative Law [Vol. 8:941

954

after he was officially sworn in as Member of Parliament, Moroto addressed a
big rally in his constituency, and he declared that the Pokot were going to use
violence (force) to reclaim all land, which historically belonged to them.53
Some of those lands were incorporated in the neighboring districts of Turkana
and Trans Nzoia during the colonial period Moroto's remarks were seen as a
symbolic declaration of 'war' against non-Pokot.
The Pokot are thus using history to justify their actions and to emphasize
territorial and communal cohesion. They feel justified in evicting non-Pokot
who have taken over their ancestral land. As Carter and Byrne note: "Political
elites often attempt to instil a sense of common fate and group solidarity by
emphasizing in-group similarities and out-group differences, depicting group
members as interchangeable and personalizing inter-group conflict. ' 54 Carter
and Byrne at the same time point out that groups tend to focus their story to fit
into their current situation, perception, and worldview.55
There is clear evidence of prejudice and discrimination against pastoralists
in Kenya. For example, they are often referred to as "primitive," "uneducated,"
and a people suffering from a "cattle complex" mentality.56 Moreover, the few
members of pastoral communities in wage employment are mostly performing
menial tasks such as night security guards and waste collectors in towns. This
is due to the fact that western education is not yet rooted among these pastoral
communities.57
As a matter of fact, State officials often threaten local chiefs with dire
consequences for failure to identify bandits and cattle rustlers who may be
operating in their localities. For example, these officials often apply 'collective
punishment' on suspected clans whose members may have participated in a
cattle raid against neighboring communities. Such acts tend to alienate the
people further from the government, whom they see as an outside force
interfering with their way of life. Seemingly, such punishment and coercion
often opens a 'Pandora's box' and often exacerbates conflict. As John Burton
posits "if co-operative and non-violent social relationships are sought by
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societies, social norms, and institutions must be adapted to human aspirations
and not the other way a round."58
The Government has tended to condemn cattle rustling among the pastoral
communities based largely on the false assumption that such raids are a
primitive factor relating to nomadic life.59 Thus, the State does not view raids
as partly an outcome of modern economic intrusion impinging on the sociocultural setting of the pastoralists. To a large extent, changing social and
economic relations has compounded the cattle rustling activities.' Part of the
reason is that commercialization and internationalization of cattle rustling
appear linked to the expanding global market for livestock and livestock
products, and the proliferation of weapons, all in the over the years.
Clearly, poverty, hunger and destitution have become part and parcel of
aggressive and predatory pursuance of political goals. In such a scenario, the
State becomes an inconsequential irritant.6 Currently the politics of pastoral
communities seem to be dominated by warlordism. The state of insecurity and
lawlessness in the borderlands and the collapse of social and economic
structures have created a category of poverty-stricken peasant-herders who in
order to survive often resort to acts of banditry and cattle rustling.62
X. DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS
In the last two decades or so, there has been some significant improvement
in medical services, especially by Christian missionaries and NGOs in the
borderlands.63 Such services have led to a steady rise in the population of the
pastoral people. In addition, the numbers of their livestock have increased.
These factors create demographic pressures resulting in more conflict over
grazing lands and water. At the same time, many people from non-pastoral
communities have acquired land in the pastoral areas. Such land loss inevitably
reduces the ability of the pastoralists to maintain large herds of livestock. The
new landowners have acquired title deeds (certificates) giving them legal rights
over such land. However, pastoral groups traditionally do not recognize
individual ownership of land since their mode of production requires expansive
territory and communal ownership of grazing lands and other resources.'
58.
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Thus, attempts by pastoral societies to ignore individual land ownership and
boundaries tend to exacerbate tensions between pastoral and agricultural
communities. Consequently, there is often a clash of cultures between western
and traditional legal systems of land ownership.
Due to insecurity in the borderlands the pastoral groups have abandoned
more than forty percent of their grazing lands and compressed into smaller
areas.65 This state of affairs affects pastoral economy thereby contributing to
land degradation, which in turn exacerbates conflict.
XI. POSSIBLE THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION IN THE CONFLICT

The violence and insecurity that has been created by banditry and cattle
rustling activities in northern Kenya can be addressed at different levels of
intervention. It appears that for a long time the Kenyan State has tended to
adopt a top-down or power-based approach in addressing the issue. Such a
method has failed miserably. Consequently, we suggest that there is a need for
State officials, pastoralists, and other affected parties should come together and
address the problem from a common ground.' Such an intervention process
would involve the use of a "grass-roots-based" or a "bottom-up" approach, an
approach that is often referred to as "peacebuilding from below." At the same
time the conflict could be addressed from an interests-based approach.67 This
is an approach that could help the interveners to assist the parties identify their
concerns and needs, and therefore possibly to be in a better position to develop
common interests on which to build some consensus. In other words, a
transformation of the peoples' attitude and worldview is vital in any conflict
intervention in the borderlands.
For example, the pastoral system must be recognized as an important
component of the Kenyan economy rather than an archaic practice that has to
be discarded. In that respect, both the Kenyan State and the pastoralists must
begin to acknowledge that each has the right to exist. Apparently, it appears
that pastoralists are yet to participate fully in making decisions affecting their
social life and economic development. Thus it is correct to say that many past
development interventions in pastoral areas have become a cropper due to noninvolvement of the pastoralists in their planning and implementation.68 Conflict
resolution intervenors, therefore, must try to address the underlying causes of
65.
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the conflict rather than merely dealing with the symptoms. Interestingly
enough, more often than not, it is 'outsiders' who decide what they perceive as
problems afflicting pastoralists and suggest their resolutions without involving
the local people themselves. In other words, the policy seems to be that
pastoralists are to be 'seen and not to be heard'. In that regard, these interveners
tend to blame the pastoralists either for "overstocking and overgrazing" rather
than addressing the underlying causes of their problems.69
An important point to remember is that many conflict resolution scholars
and practitioners agree, it is almost impossible to transform a society unless the
underlying needs of the parties involved in conflict are adequately identified,
recognized, and addressed.7" Thus, any solutions recommended by interveners
should take cognizance of the fact that pastoral communities have managed to
survive in their harsh environment for thousands of years. Hence, it would be
unreasonable to expect them to fundamentally change their lifestyle to an
untested future. Thus change must be gradual and should not be imposed from
the top. Due to suspicions and past negative experiences, both the Government
and pastoralists are often marooned in their cocoon unsure of the other's real
intentions.7
Does pastoralism in northern Kenya have a future? Will the pastoral mode
of production survive against the various onslaughts ranged against it? Both
Aronson and Dyson-Hudsons contend that pastoralism faces an uncertain
future.7 2 On the other hand, Mustafa Babiker73 points out that pastoralists are
not static and throughout their history they have adapted to new socio-economic
and physical conditions when necessary. Babiker at the same time is not
amused with claims of the imminent collapse of pastoralism. Furthermore
Babiker avers that the focus of studies of pastoral systems should change from
the 'crises of survival' model in favor of 'survival in crises' framework.
Moreover, Babiker opines that outsiders under the guise of 'experts' tend to
offer solutions to problems that they have never experienced. Some of their
69.
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recommendations are half-baked and cannot stand the test of time. These
conflict resolution and development experts rarely seek the views of the local
people when deciding on development plans aimed at ameliorating their
conditions.
It is important to note that most of the African borders are porous and
contested.74 Bandits and cattle rustlers thus find it easy to oscillate between the
neighboring States, crossing international borders at will.75 The fact that the
neighboring countries have developed different conflict management strategies
and regulations often makes it difficult to effectively manage cross border
conflicts. For example, in Uganda pastoral groups are often permitted by the
State to own firearms, yet in Kenya the government has banned gun possession
by pastoralists.76
It is our argument that for peaceful coexistence to be achieved, the pastoral
communities must accept the reality that each is part and parcel of the wider
geo-political and economic entity. We suggest that for durable peace in the
borderlands, indigenous methods of conflict resolution and cultural values
should be incorporated into the modern conflict resolution mechanisms. This
hopefully could greatly contribute to the restoration of peace, security, and
stability and cordial relations among the pastoral communities in the
borderlands. Both Aronson and David Western among other scholars of
pastoralism have poignantly argued that social life in the pastoral areas has not
improved.77 For example, pastoralists still rely on nature for their survival.
According to John Burton, for any effective conflict resolution
intervention, third party intervenors must avoid prejudiced and preconceived
views of the local situation.78 Thus, to address a conflict adequately, there is a
need for some change in the institutions and structures of the society. Thus, we
contend that to forestall or to de-escalate the inter-group conflict in the
borderlands it is necessary to address the basic human needs of the people such
as security, recognition, identity, self-esteem, and acceptance. Structural
violence 79 is evident in the way the Kenyan State has handled the predicament
of pastoral people since colonial times. Government policies have impacted
negatively on pastoral economic production. It should be noted that from a
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psychological perspective, feelings of alienation could be dangerous to both the
individual and the group.
It is our contention that for conflicts in the borderlands to de-escalate, it is
necessary to identify the underlying root causes of the problem rather than
blaming the parties involved or merely addressing the symptoms of the conflict.
It behoves conflict resolution interveners to identify and analyze the interplay
of various factors and their internal and external dynamics when addressing the
issue of violence and insecurity in the borderlands, Byrne and Carter point us
in the right direction.
Von Lipsey has developed a conflict resolution model that he refers to as
the "intervention cycle. 80 This framework incorporates the relationship
between prevention, mitigation, and resolution. Durable conflict resolution
measures often require a change in the status quo, and a strong commitment by
parties involved to play according to the 'rules of the game' rather than coercion
or acquiescence on the part of one of the parties. In other words, the building
blocks of peace must be laid on a firm ground. Jay Rothman, Edward Azar, and
Louis Kriesberg hold similar views. 8' For example, according to Rothman,
some deep-rooted conflict often cannot be resolved because the conflicts are
"misdiagnosed and handled badly." 82 Rothman has proposed the ARIA
(Antagonism, Resonance, Invention, and Action) framework of conflict
management that may help parties in conflict to move from adversarial to
cooperative change. Rothman emphasizes the importance of positive dialoguing
between parties to create a conducive environment of understanding and
problem solving. As Azar correctly points out, identity based conflicts are
bound to recur unless the underlying causes have been adequately identified and
addressed to the satisfaction of all of the parties.8 3
This article therefore suggests that this nexus between human needs and
conflict should be clearly comprehended by local political leaders, the
provincial administration, and the Kenyan State. In that regard, Kenyan
Government policy makers must take cognizance of these facts by identifying
how the environmentally (ecologically) related threat to peace can be contained
deescalated or resolved. In actuality, pastoralism cannot be simply dismissed
as an old-fashioned practice. As Doonrboss correctly puts it, the pastoralists,
"have demonstrated economic and social acumen in the exploitation of their arid
homelands. Those lands are too arid for anything but nomadic, or at best,
80.
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transhumant pastoralism. The only other option is to migrate and leave the bush
to the game." 84
It is necessary to accord the pastoralists the opportunity of determining
their future. In that regard we contend that 'outsiders' should not impose
important decisions and policies affecting pastoral mode of existence without
their active involvement from the initial stages to the implementation process. 85
It is an undeniable fact, to a large extent it is mainly Non-Governmental
Organizations and church missionaries that have attempted to alleviate the
plight of pastoral communities through the provision of schools, boreholes,
health centers, and other facilities.86 As already stated, the Kenyan Government
should change the tendency of ignoring and neglecting the welfare of the
pastoralists in terms of development and the distribution of political and
economic resources. The Government should adopt some affirmative action to
make the pastoralists move up the ladder in terms of provision of government
sponsored social, educational, and economic development services.
By and large, third party intervention should help the disputing parties to
adopt a 'give and take' approach when addressing their conflict. The use of
coercive measures to modify a behavior or resolve conflict may be
counterproductive.
This is evident in the failure of government
depastoralization campaigns in the borderlands. In deed, the pastoralists regard
State measures such as the provision of food relief during droughts as a
temporary short-term stop-gap measure as they wait for opportunities to revert
to pastoralism, either through cattle raids or other methods to rebuild their
stock. 7
The "us-them" dichotomy is a common future in human interaction.88
Thus, generalizations, perceptions, and projecting negative attributes on others
is always manifested in conflicts. However, the use of negative and pejorative
terms such as "bad," "primitive," "callous killers," or "bandits," should be
avoided by conflicting parties while they are trying to resolve the problem of
violence and insecurity in the borderlands. Such terms tend to create an
environment of mistrust, vindictiveness, and "passing the buck."
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X1I. CONCLUSIONS

This article has attempted to analyze the political economy of violence and
insecurity in the borderlands of northern Kenya using the social cubism model.
It has pointed out that the phenomena of banditry and cattle rustling have
greatly contributed to the emergence of an environment of violence and
insecurity in this region. Cattle rustling appears to have undergone a
fundamental transformation from a cultural practice to an international
commercial venture apparently under the control of cattle Warlords. By and
large, the changing land use, demographic pressures, political, and economic
conditions have contributed to the current increase in conflict and violence in
the borderlands. The institutionalization of violence and the resultant insecurity
has contributed to widespread social, political and economic problems among
the pastoralists.
The Government seems not to have adopted the necessary policies and
mechanisms that could help to forestall and address the underlying causes of
insecurity and violence in the region. Consequently, the situation has become
insurmountable. The Government's laxity has therefore somehow contributed
to the emergence of warlords, who have emerged as the undisputed masters of
the region.
In order to make any meaningful intervention in the conflict; there is a
need to reassure the pastoralists that their age-old way of life will be recognized.
In that connection, it would be appropriate to reinforce the pastoral institutional
capacities with specific reference to traditional norms, rules and regulations of
conflict resolution. By and large, third party intervention in the conflict must
take note of the underlying interests, needs, and aspirations of the local populace
when developing a conflict resolution framework for the region. The State must
try to cultivate good working relations between the security forces and the local
people for the mutual benefit of the State and the local inhabitants. The study
concludes that a concerted effort by the all stakeholders is pivotal in any
meaningful resolution of the conflict in northern Kenya.

